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APPELLATE PROCEDURE
MARTIN J. NASH*
This article reviews the more important decisions of the Florida
courts affecting appellate procedure.** The outline follows the Florida
Appellate Rules in general; sections on the extraordinary writs are included
at the end of the article.***
Application of the Rules
The Florida Appellate Rules govern all appellate proceedings com-
menced after June 30, 1957.1 Failure of an appellate tribunal to comply
with the appellate rules may be remedied through the use of common law
certiorari addressed to a higher appellate court.2
Change in the Construction of the Appellate Rules
Generally, judicial construction of an appellate rule or statute will
relate back to the time of the enactment of the rule or statute. However,
when a rule or statute has received a construction differing from a previous
construction, the changed construction does not have a retroactive effect
unless the statute or rule is jurisdictional in nature.3
In Aronson v. Congregation Temple De Hirsch4 an appeal was taken
more than thirty days from the rendition of the judgment in the county
court. Prior to the prosecution of the appeal, the district court of appeal
indicated that the proper time for appeal in probate matters was sixty
days.5 One day after the rendition of the final judgment in Aronson, but
prior to the filing of the notice of appeal, the same district court of appeal
decided in In re Wartman's Estate" that the time for appeal was thirty
rather than sixty days. The appellate court allowed the appeal by refusing
to give the Wartman case retroactive effect, reasoning that the bench and
bar were entitled to rely and act upon the previously accepted construction
of the appellate rule.
* Member of the Florida Bar; B.B.A., 1958, LL.B., 1961, University of Miami.
** Includes cases from the period of the last Survey through 131 So.2d.
*** Material in this section of the article contributed by Michael J. Osman, Associate
Editor, U. MIAMI L. REv.
1. FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES [hereafter cited as F.A.R.I 1.1, 1.4.
2. In re Grant's Estate, 117 So.2d 865 (Fla. App. 1960).
3. Aronson v. Congregation Temple De Hirsch, 123 So.2d 408, 411 (Fla. App.
1960), cert. discharged, 128 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1961).
4. Ibid.
5. In re Campbell's Guardianship, 114 So.2d 352 (Fla. App. 1959).
6. 118 So.2d 838 (Fla. App. 1960), quashed, 128 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1961).
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The issue was certified to the supreme court. The court, in effect,
held that the appeal time was jurisdictional in nature and could not be
extended by the courts. 7 However, the appeal was not dismissed because
the supreme court on the same day had decided that the appeal time in
probate matters was sixty days. 8
When the courts construe a rule, not jurisdictional in nature, and
reach a conclusion differing from their prior construction, the reasoning
of the district court of appeal in Aronson should control.
Repeal of Conflicting Statutes
The appellate rules were intended to supersede all conflicting rules
and statutes. Statutes not superseded or in conflict with the appellate
rules were to remain in effect as rules promulgated by the supreme court.9
In every situation, when a statute deals with the same subject matter as
an appellate rule, an inquiry must be made as to whether the statute
conflicts with the appellate rule, thus being superseded.
The determination of the statutes that have been superseded is
occurring in piecemeal fashion. Great difficulty will be presented with
regard to chapter 5910 of the Florida Statutes which deals with appellate
proceedings generally. As of this Survey there has been little litigation
concerning the validity of this statute. The supreme court has indicated
in Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver" that certain provisions of chapter 59
are continued as rules of court. They are section 59.04 (appeal from an
order granting a new trial by the aggrieved party) and section 59.05 (appeal
by a plaintiff after suffering a non-suit). Other statutory sections have
been declared superseded, for example, sections 59.0912 and 37.22.13
Invalidation of a portion of a statute creates an additional problem.
If the invalid portion of the statute is inseverably related with the remain-
ing portion, the entire statute will be stricken under general rules of
statutory construction. This result will occur even though the remaining
portions are not in conflict with the appellate rules.14 A great need exists
for correlation of the statutes with the appellate rules in order to provide
a composite picture of proper appellate procedures.
The correlation of rule 1.4 and rule 3.2b has caused a great deal
7. See note 3 supra.
8. In re Wartman's Estate, 128 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1961).
9. F.A.R. 1.4.
10. FLA. STAT. ch. 59 (1961).
11. 121 So.2d 648, 652 n.16 (Fla. 1960).
12. Simmons v. Gainesville Nehi Bottling Co., 119 So.2d 719 (Fla. App.), appeal
dismissed, 125 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1960).
13. State v. Robinson, 132 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1961).
14. See note 8 supra.
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of litigation during the survey period.Y' It is to be noted that rule 3.2b
provides for a limitation of sixty days for the commencement of an appeal
"unless some other period of time for taking an appeal is specifically
provided by statute or these rules." 16 The phrase "or these rules" has
been held surplusage by the supreme court.' 7
The effect of the savings clause is to preserve statutory appeal time
provisions differing from the sixty day appeal time of the appellate rules.
Rule 1.4 apparently operates to reinstate these different appeal times as
rules promulgated by the supreme court. However, the constitutional
power clause enabling the supreme court to enact rules of practice and
procedure does not include the power to establish times for appeal. That
power is peculiarly legislative.' 8 Therefore, all appeal times appearing in
statutes should prevail over the judicial pronouncement of rule 3.2b.
Notwithstanding this clause, certain appeal time statutes have fallen. 19
Assignment of Judges
Florida, as does the majority of jurisdictions, holds that when a trial
judge is incapacitated and cannot consider a pending motion it is not
mandatory that a new trial be granted. 20  The rules provide for the
appointment of a successor judge when a circuit judge is unable to perform
the duties of his office on account of absence, sickness, disqualification
or other disability.2' As a result, the circuit judges sit without personality
and the courts are not the alter ego of an individual judge.
Prior to 1961, a provision similar to that for circuit courts appeared
in regard to justice of peace courts.2 2 Under the justice of the peace court
system there is only one judge for each district. The logical conclusion
is that under the appellate rules a justice of the peace of another district
is a successor judge within the meaning of the rule. However, such a
determination would do violence to the intent of many statutes, particu-
larly criminal procedure statutes.
In Robinson v. State2 3 a justice of the peace issued a search warrant
for a home in an adjoining district. Ordinarily, a search warrant may be
issued by a justice of the peace having jurisdiction within the district
15. See generally Nash, Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 24 (1961).
16. F.A.R. 3.2b.
17. See note 11 supra.
18. Ibid.
19. See text at notes 57-74 infra.
20. Wohlfiel v. Morris, 122 So.2d 235 (Fla. App. 1960); see also FLA. STAT. §
26.19 (1961).
21. F.A.R. 2.1a(4)(c), as amended, 139 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1962); Robinson v. State,
124 So.2d 714 (Fla. App. 1960), modified, 132 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1961).
22. F.A.R. 2.la(4)(i).
23. 124 So.2d 714 (Fla. App. 1960), modified, 132 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1961).
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where the place, vehicle or thing to be searched may be. In this case,
the justice of the peace was absent on duty with the Air Force. It was
contended that the justice of the adjoining district was "another judge
...of said court available and qualified to act" within the meaning of
the rules.
Both the district court of appeal and the supreme court held the
search warrant invalid. However, the supreme court amended the rules
to remedy the anomalous situation presented by the case. 24 The amend-
ment provides that when a judge of any small claims court, juvenile court
or traffic court is unable to perform his duties, the said judge or clerk will
advise the chief justice of the supreme court who may then assign judges.
When there is more than one judge in a district, the remaining available
judge or judges may act' as under the prior rule. The chief justice, when
called upon to appoint a successor judge, may assign any judge having
the same or greater jurisdiction except a judge of the supreme court,
district court or circuit court.25
Filing Fees
The supreme court is without power to prescribe the filing fees to
be charged by clerks of courts of record of the state in appellate pro-
ceedings. Consequently, those portions of the rules which prescribe for
specific fees have been amended. The effect of the amendment is to provide
for the payment of the filing fee "prescribed by law.."2 6
An appeal is commenced by the filing of the notice of appeal with
the clerk of the lower court and the payment of the filing fee. 27  It is
noted that the appellate rule makes the payment of the filing fee a
jurisdictional prerequisite. However, the court has held the payment of
the filing fee not to be jurisdictional in nature.28
Time for Appeal
The rules provide for a sixty day limitation for the commencement
of appellate proceedings unless some other period is provided for by
statute.29 The time is jurisdictional in nature, both for appeals 0 and for
24. State v. Robinson, 132 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1961).
25. F.A.R. 2.la(4)(i), as amended, 132 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1961).
26. F.A.R. 3.2a, as amended, 120 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1960). This rule was revised again,
effective July 1, 1962, 139 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1962). However, the holding of "prescribed by
law" was continued.
27. F.A.R. 3.2a.
28. State ex rel. Moore v. Murphree, 106 So.2d 430 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 108
So.2d 48 (Fla. 1958).
29. F.A.R. 3.2b. For a more complete discussion see Nash, Florida Appeal Times,
16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 24 (1961).
30. Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1960).
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review by certiorari.3 ' Being jurisdictional in nature, the appellate time
cannot be extended by the courts. 32 Litigants cannot agree to an exten-
sion of the time by consent or stipulation. 33 If the time for appeal has
elapsed, the court should dismiss the appeal either upon motion of counsel
or sua sponte.3 4
It is the rendition of a judgment, decree or order that starts the
running of the time within which appellate procedings must be com-
menced.35 A litigant is not entitled to judicial review, either by certiorari 36
or direct appeal,37 unless the judgment or decree has been rendered.38
Rendition, within the contemplation of the rules, is the date when
the judgment, decree or order is entered of record by the appropriate
tribunal,39 or if recording is not required, when filed. 40  Until such time,
the judgment, order or decree is not final and not appealable.
The rules provide that a judgment, order or decree is not deemed
rendered until a timely and proper motion or petition for a new trial,
rehearing or reconsideration is disposed of by the lower court.41
In Seiferth v. Seiferth42 the defendant filed his notice of appeal while
a timely and proper petition for rehearing was pending before the lower
court. The appellate tribunal dismissed the appeal as not timely because
the judgment was not rendered at the time of the filing of the notice of
appeal. In this connection, the term "disposed of" was alefined in Sei-
ferth as "entry of the court's decision upon the record." 4
The motion for new trial and petition for rehearing or reconsidera-
tion must be timely and proper in order to effectively toll the time for
appeal.
A motion for new trial is timely filed if served not later than ten
days after the rendition of the verdict. 44 A petition for rehearing is timely
31. Harris v. Condermann, 113 So.2d 235 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 117 So.2d 495
(Fla. 1959).
32. Congregation Temple De Hirsch v. Aronson, 128 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1961).
33. Salinger v. Salinger, 100 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1958).
34. Braunstein v. Silhouette, Inc., 113 So.2d 436 (Fla. App. 1959).
35. F.A.R. 3.2b.
36. F.A.R. 4.5c(l); Bannister v. Allen, 127 So.2d 907 (Fla. App. 1961); Harris
v. Condermann, supra note 31.
37. F.A.R. 3.2b.
38. Until such time no judgment is final.
39. F.A.R. 1.3 defines rendition to mean "that it has been reduced fo writing,
signed and made a matter of record .... "
40. F.A.R. 1.3. The most notable situation where filing is determinative rather than
recording is in probate.
41. F.A.R. 1.3.
42. 121 So.2d 689 (Fla. App. 1960).
43. Ibid.
44. FLA. R. Civ. P. 2.8(b).
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filed if the petition is served within ten days after the recording of the
decree. 5
It is important that counsel comply with the time requirement. In
the event that a motion or petition is not timely filed and the motion
or petition is not disposed of until after the appropriate appellate time
has elapsed from the entry of the original judgment, a litigant will find
the appellate courts without jurisdiction to hear an appeal on the merits.
Further, the opposing litigant could well foreclose any favorable decision
on the motion or petition through the use of the extraordinary writs of
prohibition, mandamus or common law certiorari, as the lower court is
without jurisdiction to hear the motion or petition.
A most troublesome area in the rules has been the problem of deter-
mining what is a proper motion. It is to be noted that if the motion is
not a proper one, it does not toll the time for appeal. If an improper
motion is not disposed of by the lower court until after the time for
appeal has elapsed, a litigant may not appeal.
Rainagli Realty Co. v. Craver" is a striking illustration of an improper
motion. The defendant suffered a default judgment. The court granted
the defendant's motion to set aside the default. Subsequently, the default
judgment was reinstated more than sixty days from the date of entry of
the original dofault judgment. The supreme court granted certiorari and
dismissed the appeal as not timely filed. The court stated that the motion
to set aside the default judgment was improper and did not toll the time
for prosecuting an appeal. The court reasoned that neither the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure nor any other rule or statute provided for any
method or provision relating to the opening of default judgments. 47
There being no provision for rehearing, the only method of review was
by direct appeal within sixty days from the entry of the final judgment.
Other notable examples of improper petitions or motions are petitions
for rehearing after the granting of a summary judgment48 and petitions
or motions after a decree in probate.40
45. FLA. R. Civ. P. 3.16(a).
46. 121 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1960).
47. Id. at 653. The Third Disfrict Court of Appeal is apparently taking a position
contra to the supreme court by holding that such a motion is proper. See Bursten v.Cooper, 127 So.2d 134 (Fla. App. 1961); White v. Spears, 123 So.2d 689 (Fla. App.
1960).
48. Counne v. Saffan, 87 So.2d 586 (Fla. 1956), Weisberg v. Pen, 73 So.2d 56(Fla. 1954); Aurremma v. B-Thrifty Super Market, Inc., 127 So.2d 682 (Fla. App.),
abpeal dismissed, 133 So.2d 644 (Fla. 1961): Marans v. Stang, 124 So.2d 891 (Fla. Aop.
1960); Albert v. Carey, 120 So.2d 189 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 873 (Fla.
1960); La Joie v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 108 So.2d 497 (Fla. App. 1959). See
also Mathis v. Butler, 128 So.2d 142, 143 (Fla. App. 1961), where the court held that
a petition for a rehearing on the amount of a remittitur was an improper motion in a
law action.
49. In re Estate of Lee, 90 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1956).
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One might speculate as to the meaning of the petition for rehearing
or reconsideration as used in the rules.50 Our statutes contain procedural
devices unknown at the common law, for example, transfer of the cause
for improper venue or for improvidently taken appeals. Certainly, the
lower court should have a device available to correct its own errors. The
absence of a definite method of reconsideration in the appellate rules for
each procedural device should not foreclose the opportunity for recon-
sideration, particularly in view of the phrase "reconsideration" in the
appellate rules.
Would the judiciary abdicate from its time-honored responsibility of
interpretation and interpolation in the interest of justice? Certainly the
judiciary would not require the inclusion of all possibilities in every en-
actment of every rule. Such a result would make the rules so unwieldy
and cumbersome as to abrogate their utility.
Consider the case of Cannington v. Faroy.51 After certain testimony
had been taken, the circuit court judge concluded that no factual basis
for a claim in excess of 5,000 dollars existed. Accordingly, an order was
entered March 2, 1959, transferring the cause from the circuit court to
the civil court of record. A motion to vacate the order transferring the
cause to the civil court of record was made March 9, 1959, and denied
April 9, 1959. A petition for certiorari was filed May 7, 1959. The petition
was denied as untimely because the motion to vacate the transfer order was
not proper and thus did not toll the time to petition for certiorari. The
district court stated:
We are unaware of any rule that permits or provides for a motion
of the character herein filed by the petitioner after the entry of
the order of transfer. Consequently, the time for application for
writ of certiorari . . . had expired at the time the petition was
lodged in this court.52
The result reached by the appellate tribunals of the state has indi-
cated a need for reform. The adoption of the rule 3 similar to rule 60(b)
of the Federal Rules54 should change the result reached under prior
interpretations.
When a litigant, after filing a timely and proper motion for a new
trial or petition for rehearing, files his notice of appeal prior to the dis-
position of the petition or motion, the petition or motion is deemed
50. F.A.R. 1.3.
51. 113 So.2d 882 (Fla. App. 1959).
52. Id. at 883.
53. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.38(b), effective July 1, 1962, In re Fla. R. Civ. P., 139
So.2d 129 (Fla. 1962).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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abandoned. 55 As a result the judgment, becomes final and the appeal is
considered proper if timely filed. However, the nonmoving party cannot
foreclose a disposition of the motion or petition by filing a notice of
appeal. Until the motion or petition is disposed of, the appeal is not
timely and must be dismissed. 56
The rules57 provide for a time limitation of sixty days unless other-
wise provided for by statute. The effect of this savings clause is to pre-
serve as inviolate the preexisting statutory appeal times. This savings
clause was apparently based upon the principle that only the legislature
may enact appeal times. Notwithstanding this determination certain
appeal times provided for by statute have fallen.58
Prior to 1957, the Constitution of Florida provided for final appellate
jurisdiction in the circuit courts as to certain specified matters and "such
other matters as the legislature may provide."5 9 Pursuant to this power
source, the legislature enacted statutes providing for appeals to be taken
to the circuit court and in addition provided for the appellate procedures
to be used, including times for appeal. This constitutional power source
was removed by the 1957 constitutional amendment.60 As a result the
circuit court was no longer to be used as the main appellate tribunal.
The general effect of the amendment was to substitute the district courts
of appeal for the circuit courts. However, in situations where the entire
appellate procedures were inseverably interwoven with the designation
of the proper appellate tribunals, the entire statute fell.61
In the leading case of In re Wartman's Estate,62 the supreme court
was presented with the problem of the constitutional basis of the appel-
late procedure of the probate statutes. The appellate procedures pre-
scribed for probate proceedings provided for a double right of appeal,
first to the circuit court, and second to the supreme court. Of course
the times in which to prosecute these appeals were designated.
The supreme court held that the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit
courts and the double right of appeal provided for and implemented by
the statute no longer exists. In addition, all statutory sections referring
to this appellate avenue, including shorter appeal times, must fall under
the principles of statutory construction. The test is evidently this:
55. Frank v. Pioneer Metals, Inc., 114 So.2d 329 (Fla. App. 1959).
56. Seiferth v. Seiferth, 121 So.2d 689 (Fla. App. 1960).
57. F.A.R. 3.2b.
58. See generally Nash, Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 24 (1961).
59. FLA. CONST. art. V, . 11 (1885) (repealed).
60. See, e.g., Codomo v. Shaw, 99 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1958).
61. In re Wartman's Estate, 128 So.2d 600 (Fla. 1961), quashing 118 So.2d 838
(Fla. App. 1960).
62. Ibid.
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Where the objectionable provision is an integral part of the
statute and cannot be separated from it without doing violence
to the legislative intent, the entire statute will be held invalid.68
The Wartman decision received some explanation in Whittaker v.
Jacksonville Expressway Authority.64 The question before the district court
was whether or not the thirty day time limitation provided for by statute
prevailed over the sixty day time limit of the appellate rule. The court
held that the provisions of the statute did not fall. As opposed to the
Wartrman case, which concerned probate, the eminent domain statutes
did not contain a double right of appeal. Thus, the appellate procedures
were not so interrelated with the designation of the appellate tribunal as
to also fall.
Evidently, the existence of a double right of appeal is determinative
of the issue of severability. In Ed Lane Auto Sales, Inc. v. Weinstein,5
the district court of appeal invalidated the appellate procedures, includ-
ing the time for appeal, of the civil court of record on the authority of
Wartrman. The statutes dealing with the civil courts of record contain a
double right of appeal. 66
As of this date, the following is a partial list of times for appeal:
From the juvenile court-ten days;67
In guardianship matters-sixty days; 68
Probate matters, interests of minors-sixty days;69
Restoration of the status of competency-fifteen days; 70
Eminent domain-thirty days;71
From the civil court of record-sixty days;72
Removal of tenant-civil court of record-two days;73
Removal of tenant-county courts-ten days.74
63. Id. at 604 n.12.
64. 129 So.2d 188, 189-93 (Fla. App.), motion to certify dismissed, 131 So.2d 22
(Fla. App.), cert. denied, 133 So.2d 319 (Fla. 1961).
65. 132 So.2d 218 (Fla. App. 1961).
66. FLA. STAT. ch. 33 (1961).
67. In re Evans, 116 So.2d 783 (Fla. App. 1960).
68. See Nash, Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 24 n.13, Appendix A(1961).
69. See note 61 supra.
70. In re Campbell's Guardianship, 114 So.2d 352 (Fla. App. 1959).
-71. See note-64 supra.
72. Ed Lane Auto Sales, Inc. v. Weinstein, 132 So.2d 218 (Fla. App. 1961).
73. Placid York Co. v. Calvert Hotel Co., 109 So.2d 604 (Fla. App.), cert. denied,
114 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1959).
74. FLA. STAT. § 83.38 (1961).
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Payment of Costs
The rules prohibit the original plaintiff from taking an appeal until
he shall have first paid all costs that have accrued in the suit and which
have been specifically taxed against him. This rule may be avoided by
assigning as error the taxation of costs and superseding the order specific-
ally taxing the same.75 The rule is not jurisdictional in nature and the
defendant may waive the rule or be estopped to insist upon it.76
The taxation of costs assigned as error is certain to present future
litigation. In the only case decided in the survey period, Simmons v.
Gainesville Nehi Bottling Co., 77 a preview of the coming full length
feature is apparent. The plaintiff secured a supersedeas of the order taxing
costs after filing of the notice of appeal. The parties stipulated to permit
both litigants extension of time in which to file briefs. The brief of the
plaintiff-appellant failed to allege the critical assignment of error involving
the taxation of costs. The defendant-appellee promptly moved to dismiss
the appeal. The court granted the motion for two reasons. First, the court
held that the defendant did not waive his objection by agreeing to an
extension. Secondly, the plaintiff-appellant, by not arguing the taxation
of costs in his brief, was held to have waived that assignment of error.
As a result, the plaintiff-appellant had not complied with the rules, neither
paying the costs as a prerequisite to his right of appeal nor by assigning
the taxation of costs and superseding the specific order taxing the same.
This case opens the door for future controversy. In the event the
assignment of error and the arguments in the brief are solely for the
purpose of avoiding the payment of costs until a final determination, has
not the plaintiff subverted the spirit of the rule? What would the result
be if after the plaintiff in oral argument fails to deal with the question
of taxation of costs, the defendant moves to dismiss the appeal as frivo-
lous? He may argue the spirit and purpose of the rule has been violated,
viz., to preserve to the original plaintiff a reasonable basis by which he
can protect his rights pending the event of an appeal presenting for
review a bona fide question involving the imposition of costs.
Basis of Hearing and Determination
An appeal is heard and determined on assignments of error and
properly filed briefs and appendices. The record-on-appeal will be re-
ferred to only if necessary to settle material conflicts between the parties.
The appellate court will consider only that which is properly based upon
75. F.A.R. 3.2f.
76. Simmons v. Gainesville Nebi Bottling Co., 119 So.2d 719, 721 (Fla. App.
1960).
77. Ibid.
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the record-on-appeal. In Anderson v. Town of Groveland,78 a fourth
amended complaint was dismissed with prejudice by the lower court. It
was apparent to,the court that the circuit court judge's ultimate judgment
was influenced by the disclosures at previous hearings concerning the three
previous complaints. The district, court determined that the fourth
amended complaint stated a cause of action. As, to the three previous
complaints, the district court indicated that it was not authorized to con-
sider the allegations of the former complaints or other portions of the
record.
Assignments of Error
An appellate court will not consider on appeal questions that have
not been raised before the trial court nor properly presented by assign-
ments of error. The failure of an appellant to file assignments, of error
is grounds for the dismissal of the appeal. 79 Illustrative of this proposi-
tion is Kramer v. Landau.80 The plaintiff, passenger in Landau's auto-
mobile, was injured in a collision with another automobile. The plaintiff
brought an action against both drivers. Summary judgments were granted
both defendants. The plaintiff, in his assignments of' error, failed to allege
error in granting a summary judgment for Landau. The court held that
there being no proper assignment of error as to the judgment for Landau,
the decision must be affirmed."' The court then reviewed the summary
judgment for the co-defendant and held it to be proper in that the ex-
hibits, affidavits and depositions compelled recognition that the defendant
was without fault.
Assignments of error must point out clearly and distinctly any alleged
errors. An assignment of error to the effect that "the trial court erred
in entering judgment" was considered to be too general to be effective.82
Alleged errors argued in the brief but not pointed out in the assignments
of error cannot be considered by the appellate court. In Rank v. Sullivan, 3
the appellant raised the issue of the admissibility of evidence as violative
of the dead man's statute for the first time in his brief, but failed to allege
it as error in the assignments of error., The court refused to consider the
issue.84
Record-On-Appeal
It is incumbent upon complaining counsel to support his assignments
78. 113 So.2d 569 (Fla. App. 1959); F.A.R. 3.3.
79. Bailey v. Bailey, 114 So.2d 804 (Fla. App. 1959); Forro v. Five Sky, Inc., 114
So.2d 512 (Fla. App. 1959).
80. 113 So.2d 756 (Fla. App. 1959).
81. Id. at 757.
82. Municipal Court v. Giblin, 126 So.2d 285 (Fla. App. 1961); F.A.R. 3.5c.
83. 132 So.2d 32 (Fla. App. 1961).
84. Id. at 36-37.
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of error by a sufficient record-on-appeal. In Moyer v. Moyer,8 5 a husband
appealed the propriety of a lump sum alimony award in a divorce decree.
The record-on-appeal consisted only of the pleadings. The court affirmed
the lump sum decree because the error assigned was unsupported by any
evidence in the record-on-appeal. The husband attempted to excuse the
fact that the record-on-appeal did not contain material other than the
pleadings on the ground that there was no court reporter at the hearing.
The court took this opportunity to illustrate the methods whereby a
record-on-appeal can be created in the absence of a stenographic report.
The court first pointed out that a stenographic report is not necessary.
A narrative statement can be obtained which can be stipulated to by the
parties. If this cannot be done, then the procedure authorized by Florida
Statute § 59.14(4)86 can be used. This statute provides for recitals in
orders, judgments or decrees of the trial court, or the judge thereof, or
by a stipulation of the interested parties. The court further pointed out
that rule 3.61 can be used for a settlement of the record when material
portions have been omitted by error or accident. This can be done by
stipulation or by the trial court judge directing that the omission be
repaired.87
Briefs-Form and Contents
Failure of a party to serve and file his brief within the time allowed
by the rules,88 in the absence of an extension of time and without good
cause shown, is grounds for dismissal. This rule is relaxed in a proper
case, especially in criminal appeals. A mere oversight on the part of
counsel, for example a clerical error in his office, is not good cause.8 9
Both the official and unofficial citations should be included in all
citations of authority 0 In Keith v. Keith,"' the First District Court of
Appeal lamented the fact that they did not have the West System of
Southern Reporters prior to 1948, due to lack of legislative appropriations.
The failure of the appellant to comply with the procedural require-
ments of the brief,0 2 other than filing and serving, is grounds for a motion
to strike the brief, not the dismissal of the appeal. This was the ruling
85. 114 So.2d 638 (Fla. App. 1959).
86. FLA. STAT. § 59.15(4) (1961).
87. It should be noted that F.A.R. 3.6a, as amended, provides that the record-on-
appeal shall consist of an original record, a transcript of record, or a stipulated statement
prepared in accordance with these rules.
88. F.A.R. 3.7a (40 days).
89. Parada Holding Co. v. Sulkin, 126 So.2d 601 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 131
So.2d 201 (Fla. 1961); Monroe-Jackson Hosp., Inc. v. Scarane, 117 So.2d 6 (Fla. App.
1960).
90. F.A.R. 3.7f(1).
91. 120 So.2d 50, 51 (Fla. App. 1960).
92. F.A.R. 3.7f(4).
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in Local 1248, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. St. Regis Paper Co.,93 in which
the appellant failed to state the assignments of error in his brief on which
each point on appeal was predicated.
The court, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ganz,94 denied a
motion to strike when the appendix accompanying the brief did not refer
to the pages of the transcript. The court held that when testimony is
bound and paged separately, a reference to the pages of the transcript
but not the appendix was sufficient compliance with the rules.95 The
courts have been extremely liberal with this procedural rule. In one case
the brief of the appellant did not include the applicable testimony as
part of the appendix and the brief was without a page number reference
to the record. Nevertheless, the court considered the testimony instead of
treating the point as having been abandoned. 96
Errors assigned in the assignment of error but not argued in the brief
are abandoned.9 7 This rule is relaxed in criminal appeals and also when
there is substantial and highly prejudicial error.98
In Pait v. State,99 a criminal prosecution for first degree murder, re-
marks not objected to at trial were considered on appeal to be grounds
for reversal because of their highly prejudicial character.
When there is a jurisdictional or other "fundamental" error it may
be noticed initially by an appellate court. This is true whether or not it
has been argued in the briefs or made the subject of an assignment of
error or of an objection or exception in the court, below. Illustrative is
the case of Florio v. State ex rel. Epperson.1°° Injunctive relief was sought
against an unincorporated association sued in the association name. No
personal type service was perfected upon any of the members. On appeal
the defendants raised this defect in service. The court considered the
objection, although not raised in the court below, and dismissed the
appeal.0
A perplexing problem is presented in situations wherein an excessive
number of assignments of error are alleged and only one, two or three
general points are argued in the brief. The question presented is whether
the appellant has waived his assignments of error by not arguing them
93. 125 So.2d 337 (Fla. App. 1960).
94. 112 So.2d 591 (Fla. App. 1959).
95. F.A.R. 3.7f(5).
96. Stoudenmire v. Florida Loan Co., 117 So.2d 500 (Fla. App. 1960).
97. Simon v. Simon, 123 So.2d 41 (Fla. App. 1960); Pittman v. Roberts, 122
So.2d 333 (Fla. App. 1960).
98. State v. Town of Sweetwater, 112 So.2d 852 (Fla. 1959); Pait-v. State, 112
So.2d 380 (Fla. 1959).
99. Supra note 98.
100. 119 So.2d 305 (Fla. App. 1960).
101. Id. at 309.
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or whether the assignments initially could be struck as not complying
with the requirements of the rule. 102 In one case, 103 the appellant alleged
thirty-eight different assignments of error. Twenty-two were directed toward
the charge to the jury, eight to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict,
six to the testimony and two to the ruling of the court as to the exist-
ence of a cause of action. The brief argued two main points: first,
whether there could be implied warranty where the vendee has an oppor-
tunity to inspect, there is no fraud and the defendant is not a manu-
facturer; and second, whether there could be implied warranty in the
absence of privity. Thle appellant contended that the two questions were
preserved for appellate review by all the assignments of error. The court
held that such procedure violates rule 3.7f(4).
The court, however, held that the appellee's objection came too late.
The appellee should have made a motion to require the appellant to file
a brief in conformity with the rules or suffer a dismissal prior to the time
the appellee filed his own brief. Thus, this objection to the form and
contents of the brief may be waived.
Power of Lower Court
The rules provide the lower court with the power of supervision of
the things to be done and objections thereto, including extensions of the
time during the period after the filing of the notice of appeal, but before
the record-on-appeal is filed in the appellate court.10 4 This jurisdiction and
control over the. record relates to corrections of the record, and of the
history of the proceedings before the appeal. The rules do not permit the
making of orders after appeal to change the legal effect of the orders or
judgments from which the appeal has been taken, or to change the status
of the case so as to interfere with the rights of the appellant as he may
have asserted them on appeal. In Fulton 6 Cooper, Inc. v. Poston Bridge
6 Iron Co., 105 the defendant appealed an order granting a new trial for
the plaintiff. Contrary to the requirements of the statute, 106 the order
granting the new trial failed to indicate the grounds for the order. The
sole point assigned as error on appeal was the failure of the court to state
the grounds for th6..order granting the new trial. One month after the
notice of appeal, and two weeks after the filing of the assignments of
error, the plaintiff upon motion secured an order of the lower court indi-
cating the grounds for granting a new trial. A certified copy of the order
102. F.A.R. 3.7f(4).
103. Hector Supply Co. v. Carter, 122 So.2d 22 (Fla. App. 1960), cert. discharged,
128 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1961).
104. F.A.R. 3.8.
105. 122 So.2d 240 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 125 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1960).
106. FLA. STAT. § 59.07(4) (1961).
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was filed with the appellate court. The court reversed the order granting
the new trial because of failure to comply with the mandatory require-
ments of the rule. The court further indicated that the provisions of rules
1.38 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure and 3.8 of the Florida Appel-
late Rules deal only with the correction of clerical mistakes, and do not
allow an order which interferes with the rights of the litigants. By dicta
the court indicated that the lower court could cure the omission or the
failure to state the grounds for the granting of the new trial order prior
to the filing of the notice of appeal and thus eliminate the necessity there-
for, but not subsequent to the time of the filing of the notice of appeal. 10 7
Motions
The- rules provide that if no other procedure or pleading is specifi-
cally provided, requests to the court for an order or ruling should be made
by way of motion filed with the lower court. 08 For example, a motion
to affirm the lower court is improper in that another procedure exists for
that purpose. 0 9
Frivolous Appeals
A procedure is provided for quashing an appeal on the grounds that
it is frivolous and taken only for delay. 110 The court, of course, may at
any time sua sponte dismiss an appeal when a party has failed to prosecute
the appeal in accordance with the provisions of the rules. In Karlin v. City
of Miami Beach,"' a petition for certiorari completely failed to suggest
any constitutional basis for the excercise of jurisdiction by the supreme
court.. The court in Karlin admonished the bar that henceforth in such
situations, where there is obviously no grounds for the excercise of juris-
diction, the petitioner may subject himself to penalties and damages as
fixed by the supreme court or district courts as provided in rule 4.5c(6).
The First District Court of Appeal has announced that henceforth
it would quash certain types of appeals as frivolous. The situation con-
cerns individual tort liability interwoven with the liability of an insurance
company. In this fact pattern a plaintiff sues a defendant for negligence
(ordinarily an automobile injury case) and the insurance company defends
the case. After an adverse determination, the insurance company prosecutes
an appeal on the defendant's behalf. During the pendency of the appeal,
the plaintiff, now a jud nfesit creditor, attempts to garnish the insurance
company, and in the absence of a supersedeas of the first judgment is
107. See note 105 supra.
108. F.A.R. 3.9a.
109. Evans v. Lawrence, 113 So.2d 602 (Fla. App.), appeal dismissed, 114 So.2d
7 (Fla. 1959).
110. F.A.R. 3.9b.
111. 113 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1959).
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successful. The insurance company appeals the second adverse determina-
tion, and then moves for the two appeals to be consolidated or the second
appeal postponed until there has been a determination of the tort liability
in the first case. Henceforth, a motion to quash the second appeal will
be granted. The insurance company will no longer be able to use the
second appeal to supersede the effect of the first judgment. If it expects
to avoid the consequences of garnishment, the insurance company must
secure a supersedcas of the first judgment.112
Oral Arguments
The rules'13 have been amended' 14 to include those situations wherein
the supreme court will hear oral arguments en banc. In case after case in
the survey period, attorneys failed to comply with the rules to the detriment
of their clients. The courts have taken unusual pains to explain the pro-
cedures to be followed. The patience of the courts is waxing thin. For
example, in Haines v. State,"5 the last four words of the brief requested
oral argument. The rule dealing with oral argument specifies that the
application for an oral argument shall not be incorporated in the briefs
or other bound papers, but shall be filed on separate paper. 16
Parties
The meaning of rule 3.11a' 17 is difficult to comprehend. It provides
that all parties to the cause not named as parties appellant shall automati-
cally becomeparties appellee. The spirit of the rule is to provide for an
appea.1 by any party aggrieved without the necessity of securing the consent
of the other parties to the litigation. Illustrative is City of Miami v. Albro.1'8
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant city and defendant
police officers Clark and O'Brien. Clark and the city jointly appealed the
adverse determination of the trial court. The plaintiff argued that inas-
much as O'Brien did not appeal the court could not reverse upon the
sufficiency of the evidence. The court held the position untenable and that
the city and Clark had a right of appeal, as does any party who feels ag-
grieved by a final judgment. This introduces a more difficult question.
If the non-appealing defendant under the rule is a party appellee, then is
112. American So. Ins. Co. v. Driscoll. 125 So.2d 105 (Fla. App. 1960), followed
in American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Williams, 125 So.2d 107 (Fla. App. 1960).
113. F.A.R. 3.10.
114. In re Amendment of Rule 3.10 Florida Appellate Rules, 113 So.2d 707 (Fla.
1959).
115. 113 So.2d 601 (Fla. App. 1959).
116. F.A.R. 3.10a.
117. F.A.R. 3.11a.
118. 120 So.2d 23 (Fla. App. 1960).
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the determination of the appellate court as effective to his personal liabil-
ity as though he had appealed? Or perhaps, is the failure to appeal within
the prescribed time res judicata?
joinder of Appeal
The rules119 provide for a joinder of appeal by one of the cross parties.
In Jacobi v. Claude Nolan, Inc.,120 the plaintiff appealed a summary judg-
ment for Nolan. A co-defendant, Charett, joined in the appeal with the
plaintiff for the dismissal by the court of the cross-claim against Nolan.
Rehearings on the Appellate Level
The most important factor to be considered in rehearing is that no
new grounds or position from those taken in the original argument can be set
forth. 121 For example, in Williams v. Noel,12 2 petition for ceritorari was
denied on the grounds that no jurisdiction was had in the supreme court.
The petitioner cited one supreme court case as being in conflict with the
decision appealed from. In the petition for rehearing, five new cases were
cited showing the conflict of decisions. These cases were not argued in
the prior hearing. The supreme court took this opportunity to once again
explain its position in regard to the rule. The petition must point out the
areas of conflict with specific reference to illustrative prior decisions of the
courts which establish the conflict. Additional authorities may be presented
and discussed in supporting briefs. The petition is not to be the compen-
dium of all persuasive authorities; that is the function of the brief. The
alleged omission, oversight, causes or grounds should be set forth succinctly
and concisely. Compliance with the rules will prevent repetition of the
judicial criticism that "the petition is to be distinguished more in the
breach than in the observance of the rules."' 12 3
Taxation of Costs
It should be noted that all costs, including appellate costs, are taxed
in the lower court.' 24 The rules provide for the procedure to be followed,
reviewable upon petition filed within twenty days after the entry of the
judgment for costs. In Manganeilli v. Covington 25 the party aggrieved
attempted to seek review of the judgment of costs by filing an amended
assignment of error. The court held that this was an improper method of
119. F.A.R. 3.1lb.
120. 122 So.2d 783 (Fla. App. 1960).
121. F.A.R. 3.14.
122. 112 So.2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1959).
123. Ossinsky v. Nance, 118 So.2d 47, 48 (Fla. App. 1960).
124. F.A.R. 3.16b; Conner v. Butler, 116 So.2d 454 (Fla. App. 1959).
125. 114 So.2d 320, 322 (Fla. App. 1959).
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raising the question and refused to hear the argument because the appel-
late court was without jurisdiction of the question.
A judgment for costs in and of itself is not an appealable order. 126 An
appeal, as opposed to a petition, is improper. However, the court will treat
the notice of appeal as a petition for certiorari under rule 3.16c. 127
Evidently this rule encompasses post trial orders and judgments for
costs. One should be able to avoid the payment of costs by assigning the
taxation of costs as error. This should be the procedure when the judgment
for costs is rendered at the same time as the final judgment appealed from.
However, the procedure under rule 3.16c should be followed when the
judgment of costs is post trial in character.
Appellate Review of the Administrative Agencies
Rule 4.1 providesthat all appellate review of the rulings of any com-
mission or board shall be by certiorari as provided by the appellate rules. 128
The rule is plain enough. The problem is to determine in what situations
the rule requires certiorari to be taken as opposed to some other method
of appellate review.
Perhaps the best guide is to be found in the negative. The rule does
not have reference 'to appellate review by appeal. However, if a right of
appeal is provided for by statute, it is a substantive right and must be
afforded to litigants. 120  Thus appeal, rather than certiorari, is the correct
procedural device to secure appellate review in such situations.
The rule does not have reference to original proceedings. The scope
of the review is only to ascertain whether the findings and decisions of the
administrative tribunal were supported by substantial evidence. This pre-
supposes that there was evidence taken before the administrative tribunal
in some type of hearing. Herein lies the vexatious problem, viz., when does
the case first appear in the judicial stream? The courts have adopted the
"character of test which is dependent upon the distinction of judicial, or
quasi judicial action, from action purely administrative in nature. If the
action is judicial or quasi judicial, certiorari is the proper appellate method.
'If the act is purely administrative, an original proceeding is proper. As
riay be expected with the use of a quasi judicial test, the modern prac-
titioner repeatedly finds himself confused as to the exact method to be
used to question the action of the administrative body. The cases which
have appeared in the survey period not only illustrate increasing uncer-
126. In re Carol Fla. Corp., 118 So.2d 837, 838 (Fla.'App. 1960).
127. Ibid.
128. F.A.R. 4.1.
129. State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
[VOL. XVI
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
tainty in this area, but point up the importance of a uniform administra-
tive procedure act.1 29 a
In Alianell v. Fossey, 30 an appeal was sought from an order dismissing
an injunction brought against the county commissioners of Dade County
as individuals alleging that the board, when passing a resolution concerning
a zoning question, was acting as an administrative body. Alianell sought
to review the actions of the board, further alleging that the county build-
ing and zoning director was about to take action against him pursuant to
the resolution. The court held that the county commissioners must be
sued in the name of the county, as provided for by statute, and further that
the commission was not an administrative body within the meaning of
rule .4.1. (They characterized zoning as legislative in nature.) The cause
was dismissed without prejudice to the right to use appropriate proceedings
under the statutes (appeal de novo) . 31
O'Brien v. Campbell'3 2 illustrates how a court applies the judicial
character test. The petitioner was dismissed from the Department of Pub-
lic Safety for cause. An appeal was taken to the Personnel Advisory Board
of Dade County which gave the petitioner a hearing. The board found
that the charges against the petitioner were not sustained by the evidence.
The county manager then reviewed the findings of the board and reversed
them in part. The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus against the county
manager. The writ was quashed and an appeal was taken. The court
pointed out that this was a judicial type of proceeding. What the peti-
tioner wanted was an examination of the quality of the evidence. This
type of review is of judicial character afforded under rule 4.1 by certiorari
and not by an original proceeding.
Bloomfield v. Mayo133 illustrates the other side of the coin. The
petitioner brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against
the Commissioner of Agriculture for his failure to register a product (pesti-
cide) as required by law. The commissioner attacked this suit on the
grounds that review could only be had by certiorari under rule 4.1. The
court held that the action of the board was quasi judicial in character
and the petition for declaratory relief was to be treated as a petition for
certiorari. The court then held that the petitioner did not demonstrate that
the action of the "technical" committee was arbitrary and that it had
abused its discretion. Petitioner then brought ceritorari to question the
.holding of the lower court.
129a. For Florida's Administrative Procedure Act see FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1961),
enacted 1961.
130. 114 So.2d 372 (Fla. App. 1959).
131. FLA. STAT. § 176.16 (1961).
132. 118 So.2d 672 (Fla. App. 1959).
133. 119 So.2d 417 (Fla. App. 1960).
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The major procedural issue was whether ceritorari or an original pro-
ceeding was the proper device. The court stated the test to be whether
the statutory tribunal had exercised the statutory power given it to make
a decision having a judicial character, consequent upon some notice or
hearing to be had before it as a condition for the rendition of a particular
decision made. The court further indicated that even acts quasi legislative
or quasi executive in character may be considered to be quasi judicial, if
as a condition precedent to the commission's or board's exercise of the
quasi legislative or quasi executive power, "a notice and hearing, judicial
in nature, is required by law to be observed."'1 34 The court of appeal then
enumerated the following elements which would indicate to it whether
or not the action of the board was administrative or quasi judicial in
character: (1) due notice of a hearing to be held on the question to be
considered; (2) fair opportunity to be heard in a proceeding in which
the party affected is afforded the basic requirements of due process of
law.'1 5  In short, the court requires that some record be established by
due process of law which a court may review. The court, in holding that
injunctive original relief was proper, pointed out that due notice of a hearing
was not required in the present situation. Accordingly, it characterized
the act as administrative in nature.
In a similar case, Lyles v. Dade County,36 the court characterized
the function of the county commissioner in denying or granting gun per-
mits as administrative in nature and held that original relief and not
review by certiorari was proper.
Larson v. Warren137 cast some doubts on the efficacy of the Bloomfield
test. In Larson the constitutionality of the Florida Financial Responsi-
bility Law'38 was questioned, with particular reference to the provision
for revocation of a driving license, to be followed by a hearing. The act
of revocation is purely ministerial in character. When this action is taken,
there is no hearing, no evidence taken and no finding of fact. On this
basis certiorari would not be available to review the action of the admini-
strative body following the Bloomfield decision. However, an act purely
administrative in character may become quasi judicial in nature, if as a
statutory requirement, notice and hearing thereafter was provided for.
In the Larson case the statute provided for such procedural requirements
subsequent to initial revocation. Thus, the entire proceeding became sus-
ceptible to appellate review by certiorari. Accordingly, the statute was
held to be constitutional as providing for due process of law, to wit, appel-
late review. It is interesting to note that in Bloomfield, the court looked
134. Id. at 421.
135. Ibid.
136. 123 So.2d 466 (Fla. App. 1960).
137. 132 So.2d 177 (Fla. 1961).
138. FLA. STAT. ch. 324 (1961).
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to see if due process, notice and hearing were afforded to the litigant in
order to determine whether certiorari was available. In Larson, the court
attempted to see if certiorari was available in order to ascertain if due
process requirements of the law were met.
Judicial Review-Final Judgments
Review in law or equity is had by appeal, except where review by
certiorari is provided by law or by the rules. If the litigant desires to have
appellate review of a judicial decree, he must first ascertain if the decree
is "final in nature," for an appeal will only lie from final judgments. If
the order is not final in nature, a litigant may still have judicial review
at law by an interlocutory order at law if it relates to jurisdiction or venue,
or by common law certiorari in certain circumstances. Judicial review of
equitable proceedings is had in the same fashion except that an inter-
locutory order is reviewable, if of the type reviewable prior to the adoption
of the rules.
A judgment must be final both procedurally and inherently, that is
to say by its very nature. In many instances a litigant seeks review of a
judgment which is not final procedurally. For example, in Chastain v.
Embry,13 9 the court, in granting defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, stated "It is ordered and adjudged that defendant's motion, filed
February 25, 1959, for summary judgment, is granted.' 140 The court held
that the traditional words used to form a final judgment at law were not
employed in this order. All that the lower court did was to grant the
motion, and did not go beyond this by entering a judgment. The order
was nothing more than the basis to authorize an entry of final judgment,
and did not itself constitute a final judgment.
Stone v. Buckley14' illustrates that when an order is not final, the
court may dismiss the appeal sua sponte.
In Cali v. Zamora Jewish Center,142 the decretal part of the order read
"the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as to the Defend-
ant . . . is hereby granted."'1 43 The order was not considered to be a final
judgment, and thus not appealable.
Some motions, by their very nature, cannot be considered final in
character. The decisive factor in the determination of finality in a judg-
ment should be whether or not the motion, judgment, order or decree
effectively terminates the litigation. The following have not been con-
139. 118 So.2d 33 (Fla. App. 1960). See also State ex rel. Mott v. Scofield, 120 So.2d
825 (Fla. App. 1960).
140. 118 So.2d at 33.
141. 119 So.2d 298 (Fla. App. 1960).
142. 128 So.2d 403 (Fla. App. 1961).
143. Ibid.
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sidered final: motion to tax costs after a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint
with leave to amend;1 "4 a post trial motion non obstante veredicto, or for
a new trial; 45 an order of a court transferring a cause to a lower court
due to defects in the jurisdictional amount; 4 6 and civil contempt. 47
Interlocutory appeals at law may be taken only as to questions of
venue or jurisdiction over the person. Other interlocutory orders at law
may be reviewed by common law certiorari when a trial court acts beyond
its jurisdiction, or when its order does not conform to essential require-
ments of law and may cause material injury through the subsequent pro-
ceedings and the remedy by appeal would be inadequate. 1 4
It is to be noted that the appellate tribunal may treat an improvi-
dently taken appeal as a petition for common law certiorari, 49 but may
not treat a petition for common law certiorari as an appeal. 150 In Mapoles
v. Wilson,'!" the defendant petitioned the district court of appeal to review
the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint based upon improper venue.
The court had no jurisdiction and dismissed the petition for certiorari,
as there was a full and adequate remedy through an interlocutory appeal.
A litigant can only seek review through an interlocutory appeal of the
specific order described in the notice of appeal, and the appellate court is
precluded from considering the correctness of any other order or ruling
not described or designated in the notice of appeal. 15 2
Lower Courts Acting in Violation of an Appellate Court's Order
In In re Guze's Estate, 53 an interlocutory appeal was taken from an
order of the county judge setting aside a portion of the prior order as purport-
edly directed by a mandate of the appellate court. The order of the county
judge was thought to violate the appellate court's mandate. The district
court treated the interlocutory appeal as a petition for common law certi-
orari, and concluded that the order of the lower court was in violation
of its mandate. It should be noted that a court acting in excess of its
jurisdiction is one of the grounds for the granting of a petition for common
law certiorari.
144. Strazzulla v. Hinson, 113 So.2d 419 (Fla. App. 1959).
145. Whigam v. Bornstein, 118 So.2d 252 (Fla. App. 1960).
146. Easley v. Garden Sanctuary, Inc., 120 So.2d 59, 62 (Fla. App. 1960) (Sharmon,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, would consider this to be a final judgment).
147. Local 1248; Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. St. Regis Paper Co., 125 So.2d 337
(Fla. App. 1960).
148. Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1957); see also Taylor v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 131 So.2d 504 .(Fla. App...1961); United Life Ins. Co. v. lowers, 118 So.2d
85 (Fla. App. 1960).
149. Republic of Cuba v. Ritter, 130 So.2d 98 (Fla. App.), cert. denied, 135 So.2d
740 (Fla. 1961).
150. Fort v. Fort, 104 So.2d 69 (Fla. App. 1958).
151. 122 So.2d 249 (Fla. App. 1960).
152. 125 So.2d at 343.
153. 114 So.2d 212 (Fla. App. 1959).
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Reinstatement of a Cause after Dismissal
The case of United Life Ins. Co. v. lowers1 4 illustrates the proposi-
tion that neither common law certiorari nor interlocutory appeal is avail-
able to review the lower court's discretion to reinstate the cause after it
has been properly dismissed for a failure to prosecute within a period
of one year. The court indicated that the aggrieved party would have a
chance to review the order of the lower court by an appeal after the com-
plete termination of the litigation. The court expressly indicated that the
fact that the petitioner must consume time and substantial sums of money
in defense of the litigation, all of which could be obviated by a considera-
tion of the merits, is insufficient grounds for certiorari.
Transfer of an Action
In Kautzman v. Bandler,155 review was sought of an order of a circuit
court transferring the cause to the civil court of record, upon a determina-
tion by the trial judge of lack of jurisdictional amount. The court treated
the interlocutory appeal taken from this order as a petition for certiorari,
and then denied the petition. The case stands for the position that certi-
orari is available to review an order of this character.
I The case of Easley v. Garden Sanctuary, Inc.,156 which holds the same
as Kautzman, is interesting because of the dissent. Judge Sharmon would
consider such an order reviewable by appeal on the grounds that the order
is final and "no further judicial labor"'15  remains. The dissent further
argued that the case of Tantillo v. Miliman,18 which approved of certiorari
as the method of review, was no longer efficacious. At the time the decision
in Tantillo was rendered, an appeal after a transfer in such a situation
as Easley would have been to the circuit court, the very court that ordered
the transfer in the first place. The constitutional amendment' 59 changed
this result, and so' the rationale of Tantillo is no longer cogent. 160
Civil Contempt
In Local 1248, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Saint Regis Paper Co.,'6'
the court held that civil contempt can only be reviewed by interlocutory
appeal, while criminal contempt is reviewable under Part VI of the rules.'
6 2
154. 118 So.2d 85 (Fla. App. 1960).
155. 118 So.2d 256 (Fla. App. 1960); see also Easley v. Garden Sanctuary, Inc.,
120 So.2d 59 (Fla. App. 1960).
156. 120 So.2d at 62-64.
157. Id. at 62.
158. 87 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1956).
159. FLA. CONST. art. V, adopted 1956.
160. 120 So.2d at 63.
161. 125 So.2d 337 (Fla. App. 1960).
162. F.A.R. Part VI.
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The court held in this case that the order was of a criminal contempt type,
and dismissed the interlocutory appeal.
It should be clear that the use of certiorari to accomplish that which
is unavailable by appeal at law is not readily granted. In one case, the
trial court granted a motion to strike part of an averment in a counter-
claim, setting up ownership of an adjacent parcel of land by revocation
of an offer of dedication in an eminent domain proceeding. 1 3 The court
held that this was a law action and could not be reviewed by interlocutory
appeal as it did not relate to jurisdiction or venue. Further, certiorari will
not be available, as one cannot do indirectly that which one could not
do directly.104
Interlocutory Appeals in Equitable Proceedings
As a general proposition, interlocutory appeals in equity are taken from
those interlocutory orders or motions which one could review even though
not final prior to the adoption of the Florida Appellate Rules. For example,
courts have held that the denial of a motion to dissolve a temporary
injunction is properly reviewable by interlocutory appeal. 165
In Hilson v. Hilson, 16 the defendant husband sought a modification
of a prior modified decree. He took an interlocutory appeal questioning
the action of the lower court in allowing attorneys' fees and costs without
notice and hearing, and the abuse of discretion in the failure of the lower
court to modify the separation agreement. The appellate court held both
orders of the lower court reviewable by interlocutory appeal.
Interlocutory Appeals - Record-on-Appeal
No record-on-appeal is required except certified copies of the judgment
or order appealed from. However, appendices are required to contain other
parts of the record needed for determination of the appeal. 67 In Best v.
Barnette,"8 an interlocutory appeal was taken to review the granting of
a temporary injunction, predicated upon a restrictive covenant, restraining
the appellants from the operation of a business. Although testimony was
taken before the chancellor, no testimony was presented in the appendices,
although referred to in the brief. The court was forced to affirm the
order of the chancellor, for it is the duty of the appellant to make clear
the errors complained of by availing the court of a proper record, which
163. Taylor v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 131 So.2d 504 (Fla. App. 1961).
164. Id. at 506.
165. See note 161 supra.
166. 127 So.2d 126 (Fla. App. 1961).
167. F.A.R. 4.2.
168. 130 So.2d 90 (Fla. App. 1961). See also Coggan v. Coggan, 130 So.2d 131
(Fla. App. 1961).
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was not done. Where copies of pleadings are required to determine the
appeal, they must be included in order to allow the court to make a deter-
mination of the error complained of.16 9
Certiorari from District Courts of Appeal to the Supreme Court
The Florida Constitution'7 ° provides the supreme court with juris-
diction to entertain a petition for certiorari when a decision of a district
court affects a class of constitutional or state officers, or one that decides
a question which the district court certifies to be of great public interest,
or one that is in direct conflict with a decision of another district court
or with the supreme court on the same point of law. The overwhelming
majority of certiorari cases before the supreme court during this survey
period have fallen under the conflict of decisions category. Note that the
constitution provides for a direct conflict on the same point of law. If the
conflict is not present under any interpretation the court must deny the
petition.' 7'
Certiorari will not be employed discriminately as an added escape
route to reach the objective of a second appeal. 7 2 The petition must be
denied when it is brought on the ground that
The decision . . . is in conflict with the public policy of the
State . . . and is a matter of importance to the people . . . and
of great public interest.'7 3
When a question is certified by a district court as being of great
public interest, 174 a contention by the respondent that the question is
not one of great public interest and hence should not have been certi-
fied is erroneous. Whether a district court does or does not certify a
question is completely within their own discretion and the supreme court
will not determine whether the district court has properly certified the
question .'7
Before the supreme court will review a lower court decision by way
of certiorari, the lower court must conclusively dispose of the question
169. Gross v. Gross, 131 So.2d 487 (Fla. App. 1961).
170. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3.
171. "[TIhe record having been inspected and the Court finding that said decision
is not in direct conflict with any decision of this Court or with any other District Court
of Appeal, it is ordered that said petition for certiorari be . . . denied." City of Miami
Beach v. State ex rel. Fontainbleau Hotel Corp., 111 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1959). See also
Cypen, Salmon & Cypen v. Chaachou, 130 So.2d 885 (Fla. 1961); Butler v. Gay, 122
So.2d 189 (Fla. 1960); City of Tampa v. Banks, 120 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1960).
172. Karlin v. City of Miami Beach, 113 So.2d 551, 553 (Fla. 1959).
173. Id. at 552.
174. FLA. CONST. art V, § 4.
175. Zirin v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 128 So.2d 594 (Fla. 1961).
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sought to be reviewed.' 70 If more than one question is presented for review
on a petition for certiorari the supreme court is limited to a review of
only that point of law passed upon in the decision under consideration. 77
The rules178 provide for an automatic stay of proceedings upon filing
a petition of certiorari within fifteen days from the rendition of the deci-
sion, order or judgment sought to be reviewed. The filing of a petition for
certiorari after the fifteen day period operates as a stay upon order of the
supreme court after due notice to the adverse party. However, in order
to obtain a stay under the latter situation, good cause must be shown.
If neither the petition, brief nor anything brought to the supreme court's
attention in oral argument discloses good cause why the action in the
lower court should be stayed, stay will be denied. 7 9
Appeals from Interlocutory Orders
The general rule is that certiorari will ordinarily not be allowed by
an appellate court to review an interlocutory order in an action at law
since such an order may be corrected through appeal.'i 0 This rule is sub-
ject to the exception that where the order does not constitute a final
adjudication so as to support an appeal, leaving appellants without any
right of review unless common law certiorari may be utilized, the appel-
late court will treat the notice of appeal together with the record as
a petition for common law certiorari.' 8 ' However, a petition for certiorari
cannot be treated as an appeal. In Engel v. City of North MiCrMi,'82
petitioner sought to review by certiorari a district court's opinion con-
struing article V, section 6(3) of the Florida Constitution. Although
inherent in the district court's decision was a constitutional question which
176. City of Miami v. Green, 114 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1959). The petition was denied
without prejudice to the petitioners so they could secure, upon remand of the case, a
specific detennination of the question.
177. In Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla. 1960) a review was soughtby way of a petition for certiorari of a district court decision which stated' "there is a total
lack of certain evidence to provide proximate cause even if it might be said that there was
some evidence of negligence." The supreme court stated "we must assume the presence of
negligence, and limit our consideration to the rule regarding proximate cause."
178. F.A.R. 4.5c(6).
179. Kuhn v. Telford, 116 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1959).
180. Turner v. Turner, 132 So.2d 345 (Fla. App. 1961); Taylor v. Board of Pub.
Instruction, 131 So.2d 504 (Fla. App. 1961); Republic of Cuba v. Ritter, 130 So.2d 98(Fla. App. 1961); Riedel v. Driscoll, 127 So.2d 924 (Fla. App. 1961); Welsh v. Tropical
oofing Co., 127 So.2d 894 (Fla. App. 1961); White v. Spears, 123 So.2d 689 (Fla.
App. 1960).
181. In re Estate of Dahl, 125 So.2d 332 (Fla. App. 1960); Collier v. McKesson,
121 So.2d 673 (Fla. App. 1960). In Collier certiorari was available to test the validity
of an order entered as a result of a pre-trial conference. See also Easley v. Garden Sanctu-
ary, Inc., 120 So.2d 59 (Fla. App. 1960); Kautzman v. Bandler, 118 So.2d 256 (Fla. App.
1960); Beck v. Barnett Nat'l Bank, 117 So.2d 45 (Fla. App. 1960); Gottlieb v. Town
of Surfside, 115 So.2d 25 (Fla. App. 1959); Everett v. Mann, 113 So.2d 758 (Fla. App.
1959).
182. 115 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1959).
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potentially falls within the supreme court's jurisdiction, the proper method
of review was by appeal and the petition for certiorari was dismissed. 188
Extensions of Time
Rule 4.5c(1 )114 requires the filing of applications for writs of certiorari
within sixty days from the rendition of the decision, order, judgment or
decree sought to be reviewed. 85 Rendition is defined by rule 1.3186
as being the date of recordation of the judgment, order or decree where
recordation is required, unless there has been filed a timely and proper
motion for new trial or a petition for rehearing or reconsideration by the
lower court, in which event, the judgment, order or decree shall not be
deemed rendered until such motion or petition is disposed of.187 The
requirement of the rule cannot be extended by order of court. 8
Mandamus
The purpose of mandamus is not to establish a legal right. Its function
is to enforce a right which has already been clearly established. 89 When
a right which is given under a particular statute has been denied, manda-
mus proceedings are proper to enforce that right. 190
A judgment granting a peremptory writ of mandamus is appealable
183. See also Pavey v. Pavey, 112 So.2d 589 (Fla. App. 1959) wherein a wife filed
a motion in a divorce suit for further modification of the decree to increase alimony and
an order was entered denying the increase. Two days before the end of the 60-day period
allowed for appeal, the wife filed a petition for certiorari to review the order. The petition
was dismissed as the order was only reviewable by appeal and the petition -for certiorari
could not be treated as an appeal.
184. F.A.R. 4.5c(1).
185. Cannington v. Faroy, 113 So.2d 882 (Fla. App. 1959).
186. F.A.R. 1.3.
187. See text at notes 35-45 suPra.
188. In Harris v. Condermann, 113 So.2d 235, rehearing denied, 113 So.2d 236 (Fla.
App. 1959), petitioners contended that no time limit can be imposed on the filing of a
petition for a writ of certiorari; and alternatively that the 60-day limitation can be extended
ythe court which entered the judgment sought to be reviewed. The district court held:
the supreme court is vested with the power to adopt rules limiting the time within which
petitions for certiorari may be filed. This it had done. It was never contemplated that
the power, right, authority, or jurisdiction to consider a petition for certiorari could exist
for an indefinite period, or in perpetuity. Nor can the requirement of the rule be extended
by order of court.
189. In State ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1961) mandamus
proceedings were instituted to direct the county manager and the chief deputy county tax
assessor to submit to the county commissioners a tax roll predicated upon reassessment of
property at full cash value. The court held that the petitioners had not demonstrated that
they had a legal right to compel the preparation and submission of a particular tax roll
and therefore could not establish that right in mandamus proceedings. See also State ex rel.
Eichenbaum v. Cochran, 114 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1959); City of Miami v. Rezeau, 129
So.2d 432 (Fla. App. 1961); Dance v. City of Dania, 114 So.2d 697 (Fla. App. 1959).
190. State ex rel. Village of North Palm Beach v. Cochran, 112 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1959);
Broward County v. Bouldin, 114 So.2d 737 (Fla. App. 1959); Florida Tel. Corp. v.
State ex rel. Peninsular Tel. Co., 111 So.2d 677 (Fla. App. 1959).
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as it is considered a final order. 191 However, an order granting a motion
to quash an alternative writ of mandamus is not a final judgment and
therefore is not appealable without a provision that the petition be dis-
missed. 19 2
Mandamus is not the proper method with which to review an order
of an administrative agency.' 93 However, when administrative remedies
are exhausted, mandamus is proper to enforce those rights which have
been denied by the agency. 94
Although generally, administrative remedies must be exhausted before
mandamus is available "the law does not require one to exhaust his admin-
istrative remedies where such remedy would be of no avail."' 99
Prohibition
Prohibition involves an original proceeding' and like mandamus is
not available to seek review of an order. In State ex rel. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co. v. Johnson, 97 the supreme court had granted the respondent's
motion for the allowance of a reasonable fee for the services of his attor-
ney after the court had denied the petitioner's writ of prohibition. On
rehearing, the court receded from its order taking into consideration the
Florida statute providing that a fee will be allowed in any proceedings
"had for review of any claim."' 98 The court concluded that prohibition
proceedings are original and not appellate in nature and therefore do not
fall under the category of proceedings contemplated by the legislature
under the statute.
191. City of Miami Beach v. State ex rel. Pickin' Chicken of Lincoln Road, Inc.,
129 So.2d 696 (Fla. App. 1961).
192. State ex rel. Mott v. Scofield, 120 So.2d 825 (Fla. App. 1960).
193. City of Miami v. State ex tel. Houston, 120 So.2d 459 (Fla. App. 1960) wherein
the petitioner sought to review an order of the Civil Service Board. See also O'Brien v.
Campbell, 118 So.2d 672 (Fla. App. 1960).
194. State ex tel. Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Willis, 124 So.2d 48 (Fla. App. 1960).
Note that in this case had the legislature provided for a hearing to be held by the Industrial
Commission in which a record could have been made, then the method for review would
be certiorari. However, no hearing being available, there is nothing to review and hence
only the original proceedings of mandamus are available to enforce the denied right in
this case.
195. City of Holly Hill v. State ex rel. Gem Enterprises, Inc., 132 So.2d 29 (Fla.
App. 1961). The failure of an applicant for the transfer of an alcoholic beverage package
store license to apply first to the planning board and neyt to the board of appeals did not
preclude him from bringing a mandamus action. The planning board could only have
recommended zoning classification to the city council, and the council had already acted
contrary to the applicant's contention. An appeal to the board of appeals for variance was
also unnecessary since bars selling alcoholic package goods were already permitted in the
zone to which the transfer was sought.
196. State ex rel. Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Willis, 124 So.2d 48 (Fla. App. 1960).
197. 118 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1960).
198. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (1961).
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Where an adequate remedy by appeal exists there is no error in dis-
charging a rule nisi and dismissing a suggestion for a writ of prohibition. 199
Quo Warranto
Quo warranto is the exclusive remedy to seek relief where a munici-
pality has undertaken to excercise jurisdiction or control over land.200 In
State ex rel. Winton v. Town of Davie,201 the mayor and town council
brought quo warranto proceedings to attack the validity of the incorpora-
tion of the Town of Davie in Broward County. The supreme court con-
cluded that it did not have jurisdiction under article V, section 4(2) of
the Florida Constitution as neither the mayor nor the town council was
a "state officer, board, commission, or other agency authorized to repre-
sent the public generally." 202
199. Suptra note 197. See also State ex rel. Frates v. Bishop, 117 So.2d 25 (Fla. App.
1960).
200. City of North Miami Beach v. Bernay, 117 So.2d 863 (Fla. App. 1960).
201. 127 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1961).
202. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4 (2).
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